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Abstract  
Myanmar’s economic freedom is ranked the lowest amongst ASEAN countries. Thus 
its GDP per capita is one of the lowest too.  The low rank of the economic freedom highlights 
the fact that Myanmar’s economy is interfered with by the military regime – also called 
Tatmadaw. The question “Why is Tatmadaw reluctant to fully liberalize Myanmar economy 
even though it is a sine qua non to achieving economic growth and prosperity?” needs to be 
analyzed in order to understand Tatmadaw’s intervention in the economy. The research 
questions of this thesis are: “Are natural resources a barrier to an economic transition in 
Myanmar?” and “How does Tatmadaw control natural resources?” The hypotheses I test here 
are: (1) “The abundance of natural resources is a barrier and not an incentive to economic 
transition towards prosperous entrepreneurial society.” (2) “Natural resources are an 
important factor enabling Tatmadaw to demobilize ethnic armed groups by granting business 
concessions that become a part of a continued military power-game.” (3) “Natural resources 
partially trigger and fuel civil war between Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups due to 
contesting resource grabs.” And (4) “China’s resource hunger is conducive to Tatmadaw to 
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The paper aims to achieve the positive impacts of the free market system in Myanmar 
economy in which the absence of the military regime (Tatmadaw) intervention in the state’s 
economy. Myanmar economy, enterprises, and markets have been centrally managed by 
Tatmadaw for many decades. The centrally planned market economy gives no space for 
individuals to pursue their self-interests and benefit from the invisible hand of the market. 
The inspiration for the paper is that the economy works without any interference so that the 
country will be prosperous and the level of poverty can be curtailed.  
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The hypotheses of the paper are; 
(1) “The abundance of natural resources is a barrier and not an incentive to economic 
transition towards prosperous entrepreneurial society.” 
(2) “Natural resources are an important tool of the military in Myanmar to demobilize 
ethnic armed groups by granting business concessions that become a part of a 
continued military power-game.”  
(3) “Natural resources partially trigger and fuel to civil war between the military and 
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the Global Witness reports, National Resource Governance Institute's reports, the Union of 
Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) Director’s Report and other. The data from 
these reports are used to substantiate the outcome of Myanmar economy where Tatmadaw 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Myanmar military, Tatmadaw1, paved the way for the quasi-democratic system as the 
military dictator as a guardianship, after several years of direct military rule.  In November 
2010, Myanmar military junta held the general elections and handed over the political power 
to the military-backed the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) led by the former 
military general Thein Sein.  
Under the military handpicked President Thein Sein’s leadership, Myanmar garnered 
international trust that invited the international capital to the country. Many multinational 
corporations such as mobile companies like Norwegian Telenor and UAE Orredoo, multiple 
giants companies came to invest in several economic zones. After five years of President 
Thein Sein tenure, some minor economic reforms have been done. For example, the 
government reduced the general export tax from 7% to 2%, and the tax levied on remittances 
of foreign earnings from 10% to 2% (Turnell, 2011, p.161).  
In April 2016, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Nobel Peace 
Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi government took over the power from the USDP government via 
the 2015 general elections. The international community, particularly the West bloc 
appreciated democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi as her government had launched economic 
and political reforms. International organizations such as IMF and World Bank alike and 
many other countries helped Myanmar by pouring foreign aid, technical assistance, 
investments and loans, and writing off arrears which have led an increase in Myanmar GDP 
growth. Moreover, Myanmar citizens’ high expectation was put on Aung San Suu Kyi’s 
government, hoping Myanmar’s economic and political transition would be faster under the 
civilian government.  
Although Myanmar embarks on the path to an economic growth under the NLD-led 
civilian government, the country’s economic freedom still ranks the lowest amongst its peer 
countries. According to the 2016 Index of Economic Freedom (Figure 1) ranked by the 
Heritage Foundation, Myanmar was ranked the lowest amongst ASEAN countries and ranked 
158 out of 178 countries stranded in the category of trailing “Repressed” countries (Miller et 
al., 2016). 
 
                                                          
1 In this thesis, the military regime and Tatmadaw will be interchangeably used.  
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Figure 1: 2016 Index of Economic Freedom 
 
Source: Miller et al., 2016/ Heritage Foundation 
 
The colloquially accepted perspective, the economic freedom and the GDP per capita 
are correlated. It is undeniable that the higher economic freedom the country has, the higher 
GDP per capita it holds. In the other words, the lower economic freedom the country has, the 
lower GDP per capita it holds. This assumption is somewhat proved by Myanmar.  
As mentioned above (Figure 1), Myanmar was ranked the lowest economic freedom 
amongst ASEAN countries. This lesser economic freedom has led Myanmar towards a lower 
GDP per capita. According to the World Bank, Myanmar’s GDP per capita was $ 5721 at 
purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2016. By comparison with the same ASEAN countries, 







Figure 2: 2016 ASEAN’s GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)  
 
Source: World Bank 
Myanmar lacks economic freedom and the interference of the military regime in the 
economy still prevails. These ranks of economic freedom and GDP per capita (Figure 1 and 
2) give us more visibility of the military regime’s involvement in the economy. Although the 
military regime has handed over the political power to the civilian government, it still takes 
participation in the economy. The military regime has not given up their control not only over 
the politics but also on the economy.  
The question: “Why does the military regime reluctant to fully liberalize Myanmar 
economy though it is a sine qua non to fully liberalize the economy to achieve economic 
growth and individual prosperity?” echoes us to find an answer for this question. 
Simultaneously, the question: “what is a barrier to economic transition or what makes the 
military regime not to give up their control over the economy?” needs to be analyzed to find 
an answer. In fact, Myanmar needs an economic transition from military’s intervention to a 
free market system in order to achieve the benefits of individuals’ self-interest and society as 
a whole.  
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Thus, the thesis asks the research questions: “Are natural resources a barrier to an 
economic transition in Myanmar? How does Tatmadaw control natural resources in 
Myanmar?”  
In order to support the research questions, four hypotheses will be tested in this thesis. 
These hypotheses are;   
1. “The abundance of natural resources is a barrier and not an incentive to economic 
transition towards prosperous entrepreneurial society in Myanmar.” The 
abundance of natural resources enables Tatmadaw to remain in the economy 
without substantial reforms at the grassroots of the economic system that would 
modify the entrepreneurial incentive schemes of economic agents and change the 
quality in the private ownership of businesses. This is because the revenues from 
resource extraction can be easily expropriated within a narrow group of political 
insiders (oligarchs) and spent in their political purposes, which in turn, facilitate 
Tatmadaw to remain in the economy even longer and with a boosted strength.  
2. “Natural resources are a typical tool of Tatmadaw to demobilize ethnic armed 
groups by granting business concessions that become a part of a continued power-
game, which crowd out the need of economic reforms and market-driven social 
development.” The military has used the natural resource as a ceasefire 
capitalism2 to mitigate conflict, demobilize groups, build political coalitions as 
business concessions to the ethnic armed groups to transform Border Guard Force 
(BFP), militias and sign ceasefire agreements. 
3. “Natural resources partially trigger and fuel to civil war between Tatmadaw and 
ethnic armed groups due to contesting resource grabs.”  Control and competition 
for natural resources are conducive to the cause of ethnic conflict. The military 
regime and ethnic armed groups – the groups that have not yet signed any 
ceasefire agreements bilaterally or collectively – have sporadic clashes due to the 
controlling the resource-rich territories.   
4. “China’s resource hunger is conducive to Tatmadaw to exploit natural resources. 
China is the main importer of Myanmar’s natural resources and its resource need 
for the project of the One Belt & One Road initiative and for bringing prosperity 
to the millions of populations of Yunnan and Sichuan provinces, China. 
                                                          
2 The term “Ceasefire Capitalism” is coined by Kevin Woods who has decades-long observed the socio-political 
and economic changes in Myanmar. The metaphor of ceasefire capitalism comes from the military’s strategy for 
a ceasefire to cease conflict and stabilize the territories or peripheries in Myanmar.  
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The thesis aims to understand the political economy of the Tatmadaw and analyze 
whether natural resources play a major role in keeping Tatmadaw in the state’s economy and, 
with it, the whole country. It attempts to give possible solutions to reduce the military’s grasp 
in the natural resource and liberalize the economy from the military’s dominance in the 
state’s economy.  
Following chapter 1: the introduction; I will discuss the fundamental economic 
notions – the concept of free market system, the features of centrally planned economy and 
the meaning of transition – to capture the objective of the thesis in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 3, a brief history of Myanmar’s economy follows. In this chapter, I analyze 
the features of central planning that is how the successive military regime has manipulated 
the state’s economy.  
Turning to Chapter 4, I provide the analytical framework for hypotheses of the thesis. 
In this section, I draw attention to numerous academic papers, in which their authors have 
discussed the intricate functioning of resource abundance which is a major incentive for the 
reform capture by elites, military and political power holders in Myanmar.  
In Chapter 5, I discuss the methodology, source criticism and scope and limitation of 
research. In this section, I explain the methodological approach to the thesis and the limits of 
resources to support the hypotheses and the scope of the research areas.  
Looking next at Chapter 6, I examine the sectors of natural resources in order to 
understand the natural resources become a major incentive for the military regime. In this 
section, I focus on three main sectors – Gems, Oil and Gas, and Timber – of natural 
resources. In Chapter 7, I will answer the hypotheses by giving the consequences of resource 
grab which in turn negatively affected the economy. Moreover, the thesis will analyze the 
natural resource sectors in which the military regime has manipulated for their interest, 
political purpose and power-game.  
In Chapter 8, I will discuss the possible solutions of reducing the grasp of Tatmadaw 
in natural resource, which in turn, would help to enfranchize the economy from the military 
dominance of the state’s economy and politics. 
Lastly, in Chapter 9, the thesis concludes with a brief summary of the findings of the 
thesis and gives the recommendation for further studies.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
As the thesis aims to have the free market system in Myanmar economy, it is 
important to situate the concept and features of the free market system within the wider 
literature to understand how the market works and the country is prosperous.  
 
2.2. Free Market System  
The free market system is the basic idea of individual freedom to pursue his or her 
interest without any interference from the government. Baker (2005, p.201) defines the free 
market system as “free trade, free currency convertibility, free movement of capital.” Li 
(2002, p. 13) also states that “A free market system knits together all economic activities 
through the movement of prices, wages, costs, and rates of return. The government functions 
primarily as a facilitator in the economy.” According to Schumpeter (1976), competitive free 
markets are an institutional setup which allows the entrepreneurs to achieve the optimal 
allocation of all economic resources and thus bring an optimal pace of economic 
development. 
Adam Smith uses the term “invisible hand” to refer to the free market system as a 
metaphor. His claim is that not only individuals accumulate benefits through free exchanges 
but the society also benefits as well. The individuals’ strive to seek their benefits through 
voluntary trading in the market. Smith stated in his classic book The Wealth of Nations that: 
“He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favor, 
and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he 
requires of them… By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that 
of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it” 
(Smith, 1776, p.594).  
 
Individuals’ efforts to ensure their own well-being makes the whole society better off 
through the invisible hand of the market. 
In a free market system, the role of government is not to control the market, but to act 
as a referee to ensure the competition and fairness. The government should be similar to a 
referee in a soccer match so as to play a fair game. For example, a soccer game in which 
twenty-two players from both sides compete with each other is controlled by a referee to play 
fairly. Individual players’ strivings to win the game engenders the victory of the whole team. 
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Friedman (1955) also states that the government’s primary role is to preserve the rules of the 
game by preventing coercion, enforcing contracts, and keeping markets free. 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith stated that “In the race for wealth, and 
honors, and preferment, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every 
muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should jostle, or throw down any of 
them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play, which 
they cannot admit of” (Haakonssen, 2002, p.97).  
It is inevitable that the countries with the free market economy backed by the 
entrepreneurial exercise of private property rights are visibly more prosperous than the 
countries without it. In essence, the countries where individuals are free to pursue their 
interests grow the productivity and gain prosperity faster than the countries where the 
government controls the economy.  
According to 2017 Index of Economic Freedom – a report made by Miller and Kim 
(2017), a country with higher economic freedom has higher GDP per capita whereas a 
country with lower economic freedom has lower GDP per capita (Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3: Economic Freedom and GDP per capita 
 
Source: Miller and Kim (2017)/ Heritage Foundation 
 
By looking at this chart, it is important to see that countries that have higher economic 
freedom generate higher GDP per capita, which in turn makes the country more prosperous. 
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2.1. Centrally Planned Economy 
The theory of the centrally planned economy is typically ideologically defended in 
most socialist and communist countries, though not practiced by all of them. It is also a 
common feature of the totalitarian (political) control of the society or of military 
dictatorships, such as used to be in the Nazi Germany or Khmer Rouge Communism. The 
system of the centrally planned economy (or command economy, which we could use as a 
synonym) is the one in which higher authorities supervise individual firms what to produce 
and how to allocate resources (Grossman, 1963, p.104).  
These firms are not authentic private firms (although they could be legally declared as 
such) because their decision-making is not independent and guided by market forces. Also, 
their profits cannot be claimed exclusively by private owners. In essence, the central 
government has high control not only over the macro-economy but also over the micro-
economy and its decision-making ranging from printing money down to firm’s production 
structure, choice of production techniques, allocation of resources and its price setting.   
The centrally planned economy in its theoretical extreme allows no private decision 
making in the market and it brings the operations of economic markets up to a halt (Otteson, 
2014, p.23).  It may do this either by owning the means of production outright or by a policy 
of dirigisme that centrally controls the use and activity of nominally private property. 
Authorities implement dirigisme but support the ruling elites or cronies for their interest. 
Individual competitions are absent and the whole economy is manipulated by the central 
planners. To capture this feature, Newman (2005, pp.2-3) states that “socialists have always 
rejected views that stress individual self-interest and competition as the sole motivating 
factors of human behavior in all societies and at all times. They have regarded this 
perspective as the product of a particular kind of society, rather than an ineradicable fact 
about human beings.” 
The centrally planned economy is infamous for its lack of decentralized decisions in 
economic activities. The theory of the centrally planned economy or command economy was 
defended and practiced by the socialist countries. For example, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) practiced the “real socialism”, i.e. a nationally-specific form of the 
centrally planned economy (Grossman, 1963). We can hardly say that there existed some 
ideal form of the central planning since such completely centralized system of governance by 
direct command was hardly achievable in reality even of the times of Soviet War 
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Communism (1918-21) or during the War Economy (1941-45). Even in these days, it was the 
private initiative, independent of the central command that helped the system survive. 
Mau (2013, p.90) highlights that “The principal goal of enterprises did not increase 
the productivity of labor, but the fulfillment and over-fulfillment of their centrally planned 
targets.” Economic agents (households and enterprises) had highly distorted incentive to save 
or to invest. Growth was obtained by extra-economic methods of exogenous command, 
practically coercion, including the use of force. The plan was handed down by some higher 
power that was deemed to be capable of managing everything.  
To capture the element of the centrally planned economy in Myanmar, I will prove 
the feature of the centrally planned economy in Chapter 3: A Brief History of Myanmar 
Economy, by analyzing the military’s interference there.  This also explains how the free 
market system has been paralyzed in the Myanmar economy.  
 
2.2. Transition  
The thesis aims to transform the Myanmar economy from the military’s intervention 
to the free market system. Another aspect is to consider if the economic transition can be 
done independently of the political transition to deeper parliamentary democracy. Thus, in 
order for Myanmar to achieve the free market system, the economy needs to pass the process 
of transition.  
When a word “transition” comes out, it can be understood that the process of 
transiting from one situation to another and its meaning and aims may differ for different 
individuals and countries. Havrylyshyn (2013, p.59) states that for those of the former 
communist countries, the transition was seen as a way to defeat the stagnant economic 
conditions of the socialist world; and for those who are from dictatorship rule, the transition 
may be viewed as to defect regimes so as to get democratic institutions, personal freedom, 
religious freedom and economic freedom. However, economists focus on a market economy 
with private ownership, achieving market rules and attaining efficiency when the word 
‘transition’ comes out.  
I here want to stress the meaning of transition as a specific case on Myanmar as a 
process of military’s interference in the economy and how it can be transformed into the free 
market system. To capture the completion of the transition, Svejnar (1999, p.77) argues that 
two conditions must hold. These two are:  
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a) Central planning is abolished and no longer serves as the allocational and 
the distributional mechanism in the economy, and, 
b) Central planning and direct government intervention are replaced by ‘an 
efficiently functioning market system’. The transition economies generate 
relatively rapid and sustainable rates of economic growth and become 
compatible with advanced market economies in the sense that neither side 
requires major protection through subsidies or barriers against trade, capital 
flows, and labor mobility.  The crucial institutional assumption is that it is the 
entrepreneur (instead of bureaucrats) who becomes the dominant economic 
agent. This strikes the distinction between state capitalism and entrepreneurial 
capitalism. 
Many countries have passed the process of transition to achieve a free market system 
in different ways. Thus, Myanmar needs to pass this process to gain economic freedom so 
that individuals and society will be prosperous and the country will gain the economic growth 
and prosperity.    
 
Chapter 3: A Brief History of Myanmar Economy: The Features of Central Planning   
The Myanmar economy can be divided into four periodic phrases – Golden Age, 
Socialist Era, Military Dictatorship and Semi-Democratic Era.   
3.1. Golden Age (1948 – 1962) 
Myanmar gained independence from British colony on January 4, 1948. In April 
1948, Myanmar’s newborn government announced a two-year economic plan “an 
enunciation of the economic aspirations and of the economic principles to guide the process 
of advancement” (Than, 2007, p.54; Tun, 1960, p.492). 
Many understand the socialist era as General Ne Win’s the Burmese Way to 
Socialism after building his political power through the military coup in 1962. However, the 
ideology of socialism started even before.  Silverstein (1977, p.151) stated that “Socialism 
has been the goal of every government in Burma since independence.”   
Under the ideology of socialism, the Myanmar economy was centrally planned by the 
state. In 1950, the government attempted to control the strategic sectors such as the state’s 
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rice export and foreign exchange by nationalizing and restricting upon them (Than, 2007).  In 
1952, the government launched Pyidawtha (Eight- Year Plan) to establish a democratic 
welfare state via a state-led strategy of “big push” and improve the standard of living of its 
citizens (ibid, pp.54-55). 
While the government paved the way for the feature of the centrally planned 
economy, the military started ‘rubbing salt into the wound’ in the Myanmar economy. The 
military started its participation in the economy by establishing the Defense Services Institute 
(DSI) in 1951 so as to provide the welfare to service personnel and their families and advance 
the military’s political agenda (Myoe, 2009, p.174). The military-controlled DSI expanded its 
involvement in the business sectors by diversifying into retail and wholesale trade, services, 
banking, shipping, manufacturing, and publishing (ibid; Than, 2007, p.57). Its businesses 
were successful due to its special status under the Special Company Act of 1950 and became 
the largest business conglomerate in Myanmar by the late 1950s (ibid).   
Yet the military regime took participation in the economy, the government practiced 
its partially unfettered economic policies that the private sector was invited to invest in a 
wide range of economic activities and the government gave guarantees against expropriation 
for at least ten years (Than, 2007, p.56). In the 1950s, the agriculture was a major production 
in Myanmar and the state focused on rice production. Rice production under the 
parliamentary government generated a huge surplus for export leading to investments in 
processing infrastructure and industry developments which supported the rice industry as 
well as mining and timber industries already dominated by foreign business interests. 
Myanmar was thus in its “golden age” in terms of its economic productivity, though 
there was government control over and military participation in the economy (Kyi, et al., 
2000, p.3).  
 
3.2. Socialist Era (1962 – 1988) 
The Myanmar economy was said to be spoiled under the socialist era and initiated the 
end of the invisible hand mechanism. General Ne Win who was the Commander-in-Chief of 
Myanmar Force, controlled the power through a military coup on 2 March 1962 (Taylor, 
2015, p.255).  
After taking the political power, General Ne Win’s new government— the Burmese 
Way to Socialism—nationalized all economic assets and expropriated private industries and 
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businesses. Under Gen. Ne Win government, the military was required to refrain from 
directly engaging in commercial activities. It, however, continued on a very small scale, in 
order to fulfill the welfare needs of soldiers and their families (Myoe, 2009, p.175).  
Under Gen. Ne Win’s government, the country faced a disparage situation in 
numerous sectors such as education or health, as well as in the standards of living and 
economy. Taylor also argued that “the autarkic economic policies of that period, as well as a 
strictly neutralist foreign policy, led to Burma's inability to keep pace with the economic 
development of its neighbors in South East Asia” (1998, p.7).  
Furthermore, the Ne Win’s government faced political measure by ethnic insurgencies 
and the rise of the communist group – Communist Party of Burma (CPB), across the Sino-
Myanmar border. The military often had to fight and push those groups toward further 
peripheries. Diverse ethnic insurgencies and CPB controlled much of the borderlands and the 
army was left with insufficient resources to fight and wipe out (Bunte, 2017; Smith, 1999).  
In 1987, Gen. Ne Win’s government devalued Myanmar’s currency 25, 35 and 75 
kyat bank notes without warning or compensation, so as to stop inflation and put an end to 
the black market activities, (Bunte, 2017, p.99).  This devaluation rendered more than 70 
percent of the country’s currency worthless (ibid). Furthermore, the currency crisis and 
economic downturn due to further economic mismanagement led massive student 
demonstration across the country in 1988. In July 1988, the students’ protests rocked the 
nation and toppled Gen. Ne Win’s government. When Gen. Ne Win was forced to abdicate 
the political power due to the student uprising, Gen. Saw Maung led the military regime that 
took the political power again. 
The socialist era witnessed the consequence of the centrally planned economy with 
the economic downturn and the isolation of the Myanmar economy. The mismanagement of 
Gen. Ne Win’s government led the surge of ethnic insurgencies and the communist party 
which has led the endless civil war.  
 
3.3. Military Dictatorship (1988 – 2011) 
After the fall of Gen. Ne Win’s socialist era, a new military dictatorship arose. On 18 
September 1988, General Saw Maung re-established direct military rule and dubbed the State 
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) for his government (Steinberg, 2001).  The 
SLORC then revoked the 1974 Constitution, dissolved parliament, controlled all executive, 
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legislative and judicial powers, and reasserted the control over the state’s economy (Bunte, 
2017, p.100). 
In 1990, the SLORC held the general election. The National League for Democracy 
was born out of the students’ uprising in 1988; it won in a landslide, winning 392 of 485 
seats, (Irrawaddy, 2012a). The election result was nullified by the military regime, however, 
which argued that the country lacked a constitution for transferring power to a new 
government. Gen. Saw Maung was forced to resign by Gen. Than Shwe. The military regime 
led by Gen. Than Shwe detained the NLD’s party leader Aung San Suu Kyi and kept her 
under house arrest for the next two decades. 
The Junta Than Shwe era, the policies were often shrouded in secrecy and used 
opaque language. Bunte (2017, p.101) analyzes the military’s policies into fourfold – the 
modernization of the armed forces, the deepening of the military’s involvement in the 
economy, the demobilization of insurgencies, and the attempt to establish a political order. 
These policy goals were manufactured by Gen. Saw Maung’s self-proclaimed goals, for 
example, ‘non-disintegration of the union’ (SLORC, 1988). In order to fulfill the 
aforementioned goals and policies and fund the expansion of the military, the SLORC started 
building up its business empire (Bunte, 2017). The military adopted a state-mediated 
capitalism from Gen. Ne Win’s state-socialism.  
In 1990, the military launched the giant business conglomerate dubbed ‘Union of 
Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL)’ under the Ministry of Defense. Military 
generals collectively own a 40 percent stake in the massive UMEHL, which is Burma’s 
largest state-controlled firm (Zin, 2003).  The UMEHL controlled diverse businesses such as 
transport, gem and jade extraction, agriculture, tourism, hotels, and construction (Myoe, 
2009; Bunte, 2017, p.102).  The military dominated the economy via large intrinsic rules and 
regulations which favor the military’s companies a central position. Myoe (2009, p.176) 
pointed out, “As a special company, the UMEHL enjoys the privilege of tax exemption for its 
fully owned and subsidiary firms, but affiliated firms are not included.”  
In 1997, the military launched another economic firm dubbed ‘Myanmar Economic 
Corporation (MEC)’ which was founded totally on capital gained from state-owned 
enterprises. The MEC has dominated several business firms and signed joint venture 
agreements with foreign companies (Myoe, 2009, p.201; Ford et al. 2016, p.26). By 2009, the 
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MEC had an insurance monopoly, 21 factories, banks and a cement plant and all of its shares 
are owned by military personnel (Bunte, 2017, p.103).  
The main objective of the UMEHL and MEC was to generate the benefits for higher 
military generals, support welfare organizations of the regime, veteran organizations and 
retired military personnel (Bunte, 2017, p.102). In all major investments, both domestic and 
foreign firms have to deal with either the UMEH or MEC. Linn (2012) states “the country’s 
important natural resources and heavy industries including import, export, and service sectors 
are monopolized by the UMEHL, MEC and their cronies. It is an open secret that military-
managed business firms and crony enterprises are corrupted in various ways including tax 
evasions.” The military also engaged in a wide range of commercial interests and enterprises 
at the local level with local businessmen and ethnic elites. Those who engaged in these 
businesses became unusually rich (Bunte, 2017).  
The military dictatorship era, the military, and numerous ethnic armed groups reached 
ceasefire agreements which significantly reduced the internally armed threat the military 
faced. The military allowed the ethnic armed groups who signed ceasefire agreements to 
retain their weapons and exercise control over the territories particularly across Sino-
Myanmar and Thai-Myanmar borders (ibid). During ceasefire periods, the military expanded 
its territorial control in ethnic states, in which regional commanders and relevant state 
agencies gave out licenses to do businesses and extract the region’s natural resource (Woods, 
2011).  
After drafting a new constitution that was then approved by a controversial 
referendum in May 2008, Myanmar’s military regime planned to hold a general election in 
November 2010. The military formed the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) 
from its mass social organization what was called ‘the Union Solidarity and Development 
Association’. As the party was formed by the military, all party candidates were ex-military 
generals who resigned their military posts and became party members. Thus, their party goal 
is to rule the country with civilian uniforms after transforming from military uniforms.  
The military also restricted the number of parties that formed via the ‘Political Parties 
Registration Law.’ A total 47 parties filed to register, 42 were approved, whereas 5 parties 
were rejected by the Election Commission due to their potential success in the elections 
(Horsey, 2011, p. 31). Thus, the National League for Democracy (NLD) – the biggest 
opposition group – boycotted the elections, charging that the process is unfair and 
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undemocratic, but the military regime finally allowed holding the general elections in 2010 
(TNI, 2015). The unfree and unfair 2010 election favored the USDP party, which won a 
landslide victory. According to the Union Election Commission (UEC) report, the USDP won 
883 seats out of 1154 total seats for central and regional (state) parliaments. In the central 
parliaments, 259 seats of 325 seats from Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw), 129 seats of 168 
seats from Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw). In regional parliaments, 495 seats of 661 seats 
(ALTSEAN-Burma, 2010). The USDP appointed Thein Sein – a former military general – as 
President and the military eventually handed over power to the USDP government in April 
2011.  
 
3.4. Semi-Democratic Era (2011 – present) 
Thein Sein’s government took the political power from the direct military regime, but 
the military secured a number of veto positions via the Constitution and deepened its 
involvement in the economy. The political system became a semi-democratic body in which 
the military acts as guardianship in Myanmar’s political dynamics. MacDonald (2013) points 
out in the East Asia Forum that “there is an emerging political multi-polarity, and the military 
(or ‘Tatmadaw’) is no longer the exclusive repository of power in Burma. While it has close 
connections to the USDP government, which was handpicked by General Than Shwe before 
he handed over power, the military has retreated from controlling all aspects of the process 
and in many respects is almost completely absent.” 
Tatmadaw holds de jure political power given by the Constitution (Constitution, 
2008). It grants the military a role in ‘the national leadership of the state’ and makes it the 
principal safeguarding force for the constitution, (Section 6-f, and 20 of Chapter 1: Basic 
Principle). The military obtains 25% of the seats reserved in the central and state legislatures 
(Sections 109-b, 141-b, and 161-d of Chapter IV: Legislature).  
The military controls the three powerful ministries namely the Defense, Home Affairs 
and Border Affairs and all ministers of these ministries are directly appointed by the 
Commander-in-Chief of the military (Section 231-b (ii) of Chapter V: Executive). The 
Defense Ministry bridges between the commander-in-chief and the government body. The 
Border Affairs Ministry oversees the border affairs. The borders are in ethnic minority states 
and border trades are controlled by the Border Affair ministry. The Home Affairs Ministry 
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controls both the General Administration Department which manages all administrative 
functions from the central level down to village level and police force.  
The National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) was formed with eleven persons 
which include the military - the Commander-in-Chief, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, 
Vice-President I, Defense Minister, Home Affairs Minister and Border Affairs Minister - and 
civilians - the President, Vice-President II, the Speakers of both houses, Foreign Minister, 
(Sec 201 of Chapter V: Executive). Majority voting power goes to the military with its 6 
members against 5 people in the council. The final decision on any major issue, for example, 
declaring a state of emergency, is decided in the NDSC (Chapter XI of the Constitution).  
The military also has a de facto veto power over any major constitutional changes 
since a quorum of 75 percent in the legislature is needed to change the Constitution (Section 
436 of Chapter XII: Amendment of the Constitution). Indeed, the Constitution is heavily 
loaded in favor of the military and guarantees a leading role for the military. The CDES’s 
Briefing Paper states “with the constitutional rights and powers that they wield under the 
2009 constitution, they can either be instrumental in advancing the cause of the reform 
process or be detrimental in sabotaging the entire reform efforts” (CDES, 2018, p. 1). 
Tatmadaw is given the power not only by the Constitution, but many retired military officers 
have taken several posts in various sectors of government; for example, in the Education, and 
Health (Zaw, 2015). 
The new semi-democratic government under former President Thein Sein made 
notable political and economic reforms. To give some examples of the political reforms, the 
government freed thousands of the country’s political prisoners including the Nobel Peace 
Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, ended strict press censorship, and reduced the 
restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly. In economic reforms, the government gave 
licenses to foreign multinational behemoths like Telenor and Orredoo telecommunication 
corporations and the Central Bank (CB) allowed eleven private banks to trade foreign 
currency and four private banks to handle remittance and established a managed float of the 
Myanmar currency - kyat. A new Foreign Investment Law was introduced (Irrawaddy, 
2012b). Two special economic zones (SEZs) – Dawei and Thilwa - have been built.  
The government then held the 2012 by-election in order to replace the vacant seats in 
parliaments for both central and regional. By-election is held because some of these seats 
become vacant due to either elected Members of Parliament (MPs) are appointed for cabinet 
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ministers or die. Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi-led NLD party decided to contest 
the 2012 by-election and won 43 seats of 45 seats both for central and regional parliaments 
(BBC, 2012).  
Profound Economic reforms started after an international democracy icon Aung San 
Suu Kyi took participation in the government. The international community, particularly the 
West bloc appreciated that step and thus lifted economic sanctions which were imposed on 
Myanmar for decades. International organizations such as World Bank and IMF alike and 
many other countries helped Myanmar by pouring foreign aid, technical assistance, 
investments and loans, and writing off arrears. For example, Norway canceled all the $534 
million and Japan wrote off more than $3 billion of Myanmar debts (Reuters, 2013).  
In 2015 general election, Aung San Suu Kyi-led the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) again won in a landslide. The NLD government created the State Counselor position 
for Aung San Suu Kyi since she was banned by the Constitution due to her spouse and sons 
are foreigner [British citizen]. The NLD government appointed Htin Kyaw3 as the President, 
but Aung San Suu Kyi is a de facto leader in the country. The NLD government has launched 
some reforms in the economy. For instance, the ‘Company Act’ which has a lesser restriction 
on both domestic and foreign companies was enacted (Latt, 2017).  
However, these reforms are limited and do not lead to major changes for economic 
liberalization since the military is powerful to halt any major economic reforms. Bunte (2017, 
p.106) states that “The military oligarchy transformed itself into an electoral-authoritarian 
regime ruled by a civil-military coalition under the leadership of the military proxy party 
USDP. The State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi herself admitted she cannot control the 
military under the Constitution (Naung, 2017).  
Tatmadaw still intervenes in the economy through two decades-long conglomerates – 
the UMEHL and MEC – which generate multi-billions of dollars for the military generals 
(Peel, 2017). The UMEHL and MEC work with business cronies those who have close 
personal and business connections with military officers, political elites, and the highest 
levels of the ruling elites (Ford et al., 2016). For example, the telecom operator MYTEL a 
joint venture company which will become Myanmar’s forth telecom operator launched in 
March 2018. The company (MYTEL) is owned by ‘Vietnam’s Viettel Group’ as a joint 
venture with the ‘Star High and Myanmar National Telecom Holding Public Limited 
                                                          
3 Htin Kyaw was replaced by Win Myint for his presidency in March 2018.  
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(SHMNTHPL)’ owned by the son of Tatmadaw’s Commander-in-Chief. The 51 percent of 
the company’s stake is owned by Myanmar’s SHMNTHPL and 49 percent by Vietnamese 
(Lin, 2018). 
All in all, the military regime holds ultimate political power given by the Constitution 
and can reject all major reforms made by the civilian government if the reforms seem to 
negate their interests and benefits, for example, enacting mining laws which may harm their 
resource extractions.  
 
Chapter 4: Analytical Framework  
There may have many incentives for the military to keep in the economy; however 
this thesis employs an analytical framework for targeting one particular factor: to examine the 
role of natural resources of Myanmar in the military clout and to verify whether the natural 
resources play a major determinant of the military not to liberalize the economic system and 
establish a political freedom.  
A natural resource is naturally given and seems a blessing for human beings. 
However, an abundance of natural resources does not necessarily mean a blessing if the 
country cannot manage its endowments properly. It is well known in the literature that 
abundance of natural resource can be a curse rather than a blessing.  
The abundance of resource normally leads toward what is called “Resource Curse”. 
The term was coined by Richard M. Auty who describes the puzzling phenomenon of 
resource-rich countries that normally tend to be poor, whereas the countries with poor 
resources tend to be more prosperous (Auty, 1994, p.11). The resource abundance tends to 
induce the resource curse through unfavorable high price volatility for the commodity, the 
crowding out of manufacturing sector, the conflict or civil war, Dutch disease effects, plus 
poor institutions and bad governance (Frankel, 2010). Murshed (2001, p.113) claimed that 
“…a country with a greater endowment of natural resources relative to the rest of the world 
may be blessed for the present, but will eventually be subjected to a ‘winners curse’.” Sachs 
and Warner (1995, p.1) also state that resource-rich countries tend to grow more slowly than 
resource-poor countries.  Simply said, countries with rich resources are biased to quick easy 
gains that constrain the development in the long run. 
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Resource abundance can also induce what is called “Dutch Disease” (Anty and Gelb, 
2001, p.129). In a Dutch Disease Model, the three sectors: natural resource (a tradable), non-
resource (manufacturing), and service (non-tradable) are included in the economy (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995, p.6). If the country experiences the greater the natural resource endowment 
(tradable sector), the lower is the demand for non-tradable goods (service sector). 
Consequently, the manufacturing sector which can endorse the service sectors tends to shrink. 
In the other words, when a country has an abundance of natural resources, natural resources 
become a major tradeable production, but manufacturing shrink and labors and capital that 
can be used in the manufacturing sector go to the resource extraction. The shrinkage of the 
manufacturing sector is dubbed the ‘disease’ (ibid). The country suffers from unemployment 
and thus also the wages in the rich natural resource sector are relatively low, which constrains 
the aggregate demand and spending on services and domestic manufacturing. High exports of 
natural resources tend to appreciate the exchange rate, which impairs the exports of 
manufacturing and services. High profits of the oligarchs often end up in imported luxury 
goods and on the accounts abroad. Profits are not plowed back into a harmonious national 
development and overall prosperity.  
Natural resource sector tends to be dominated by monopolies or oligopolies – thus it 
is easily captured by political forces. The natural resource businesses that are controlled by 
oligarchs (in private or semi-private entities of ownership) can be easily converted into cash 
by selling them to foreign owners. In the end, both transfer the majority of proceeds and 
rents/dividends to tax havens abroad, leaving the national prosperity high and dry. 
There are many causal linkages between natural resources and political outcomes. 
Natural resources are major incentives for the military regime to remain in the economy. 
Ross (2001, pp.332-335) asserts that three causal mechanisms might explain the alleged link 
between natural resource and the military regime. The first causal mechanism is the “rentier 
effect,” the second one is a “repression effect” and the third one is “modernization effect.”   
Ross argues that the “rentier effect” may occur if the military regime earns 
considerable revenues from resource extraction. He discusses other three sub-causal effects 
that can be found in the “rentier effect.” The first one is ‘taxation effect’.  The revenues from 
resource extraction reduce the need for the regime to collect taxes from the population, which 
may hamper the economic and political reforms. The fact is that low-taxed citizens may 
demand less accountability of the regime which in turn lessening the pressure to get better 
institution quality. The second causality is a ‘spending effect’. The revenues from resource 
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extraction allow the regime to mitigate dissents among the population, for instance, by 
spending on patronage. The third causality is a ‘group formation effect’. The revenues from 
source extraction enable the military regime to prevent the formation of social or special 
interest groups.  
What Ross discusses is that the “repression effect” is the linkage between the natural 
resource and the military regime. The revenues from resource extraction allow the military 
regime to spend on internal security and block the population’s political demands. Although 
citizens want political changes or democracy, the regime represses them by spending a huge 
amount of money on internal security.  
The “modernization effect” holds that democracy is caused by a collection of social 
and cultural changes that in turn are caused by economic development (Lipset, 1959). In the 
other words, if economic development does not produce these cultural and social changes, it 
will not result in democratization.  
The revenues from natural resources may also lead to larger military forces for two 
reasons. The first reason is self-interest in which the revenues have given the opportunity to 
better arm itself. The second reason is the abundance of natural resources causes ethnic 
conflict in which a larger military might reflect the regime’s response. As normally the 
natural resources are not symmetrically distributed but concentrated in few geographic 
locations, some regions are privileged while the other is excluded. In case the resources are 
unearthed in peripheral geographies where ethnic minorities live, as is the case of Myanmar, 
resource extraction can exacerbate ethnic tensions and lead to violent conflicts. 
All in all, natural resource abundance is theoretically a tool for the regime to maintain 
their powers and use the revenues from resource extraction for their political purposes which 
enables the military to remain in the economy.  
 
Chapter 5: Methodology  
This thesis employs a single-case study on the natural resource extraction. The 
methodology involves a descriptive analysis of Tatmadaw’s involvement in extracting natural 
resources to capture the volume of military’s participation in the economy.  
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The thesis will use “narratives” by deploying simple data. The policy part of this 
thesis will be prescriptive and partially normative: pointing out “what should be done” in 
order to satisfy some objectives.  The research relies on sources such as research papers from 
the Global Witness reports, National Resource Governance Institute's reports, the Union of 
Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) Director’s Report and other. The data from 
these reports are used to substantiate the outcome of Myanmar economy where Tatmadaw 
interferes with it. The thesis mainly uses economic data from institutions such as World Bank 
and IMF.  
The thesis also employs the comparative method to capture the differentiation 
between Myanmar and its neighboring peers by using different indicators such as the 
economic freedom index, GDP per capita, and et cetera.   
 
5.1. Scope and Limitation 
There may be many determinants that enable Tatmadaw to remain in the Myanmar 
economy and may have many barriers to an economic transition from military’s participation 
to a free market economy and democracy.  
However, this thesis focuses on a natural resource that seems to be a major barrier to 
an economic transition in Myanmar. Natural resources include mining mineral, for example, 
coal, jade, rubies, silver etc., logging timbers and teak and smuggling wild animals and more. 
However, my thesis focuses on three sectors –gems, energy sources, and logging forest. In 
the gems sector, jade, gold, and amber are included. In the energy sectors, oil and gas mining 
are included. In the logging sector, timber, hardwood, and hongmu are included.  
The reason to narrow down on three sectors is that these natural resources not only 
make Tatmadaw fulfill their interest, power-game, and purposes but also are conducive to the 
ethnic conflict.  
 
5.2. Source Criticism 
After many years of military dictatorship in the country, it is very difficult to obtain 
reliable and accurate data and information regarding the economic activities and more. Due to 
Myanmar’s autarkic economic policies, even the IMF or World Bank cannot obtain the 
nuanced and genuine data of economic indications in Myanmar.   
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Many scholars are skeptical about the accuracy of Myanmar’s statistics particularly 
reported by the government to international organizations. Turnell (2009, p.9) states that 
“Accessing reliable and accurate data on almost anything to do with contemporary Myanmar 
is extraordinarily difficult – except when it is utterly impossible.” 
Besides, Myanmar has little published national accounts and many other data 
categories are not available since the military regimes neglected even to collect.  Turnell 
(2009) expressed the scant of data in Myanmar as ‘data pathology’ (ibid). Thus, this thesis 
proceeds while cognizant of Myanmar’s scant data, but the common-sense measures will be 
used to partially overcome it. This includes comparing the data of Myanmar to that of peer 
countries, evaluating published data, and so on.  
 
Chapter 6: Natural Resources 
Natural resources are typical non-renewable resources – once they are extracted, they 
are lost. They have once important economic characteristic: their marginal costs of extraction 
can be much smaller than the marginal revenue accruing from their sale, offering thus 
enormous profits to the lucky owners of their extractable deposits or to the lucky agents with 
the opportunity to extract them, even though this extraction even may not be legal. These 
special profits from natural resources are called economic rents (Tollison, 1982). If there are 
not sufficiently high taxes on rents that would reflect the social interest in the controlled 
extraction of natural resources, the rents are easily privatized and excluded from using them 
for the social development.  
Myanmar is geologically rich and is home to substantial natural resources. Natural 
resources range from significant quantities of minerals, for example, coal, jade, rubies, silver 
etc., to logging timbers and teak and more. For example, Myanmar supplies approximately 
90% of rubies in the world (EITI, n.d.). However, due to a Tatmadaw that ruled the country 
with one iron fist and stole the state revenues with the other, these resources have been 
shackled as the private businesses of elite military families.   
This thesis focuses on three sectors – gems, energy sources, and logging – in order to 
understand how the military regime manipulates the natural resources, how natural resources 




6.1. Gems: Jade, gold, amber 
Myanmar’s gems are one of the most precious stones and the revenues from exporting 
gems amount to billions of dollars. In this section, jade, gold and amber sectors are analyzed 
to reflect the gems business.  
6.1.1. Jade 
Jade is the most famous natural resource in Myanmar and the country is also the 
world’s largest single source of jade which is nearly 70 percent of the world’s jadeite (Werid, 
n.d.). Mining jade is situated in Phakant Township, the west-south of Kachin State, northern 
Myanmar. The revenues from exporting jade contribute a substantial amount of Myanmar’s 
GDP share. According to the Global Witness report, the revenues from exporting jade 
contribute 48% of Myanmar’s GDP (Global Witness, 2015, p.6). Yet the Chinese import data 
indicated the value of official jade production in 2014 was over the USD 12 billion, it appears 
likely to have been as much as USD 31 billion (ibid; Linn, 2016).  
In 2014, USD 27.44 million-worth jadeite necklaces sold in Hong Kong and the sale 
was a record-breaking (Global Witness, 2015). Likewise, in October 2016, one of the world’s 
most valuable pieces of jade (See Picture A: at Appendices) was unearthed and the stone is 
valued at £140 million (Khan, 2016).  
Myanmar earned the billions of dollar from extracting jade, but local people have 
little access to these resources. Instead of benefiting from resource extraction, local people 
are seeing their livelihoods disappear due to the intensifying scramble for their most prized 
asset. Local people dubbed “freelance miners” – who eke out their livelihoods by scavenging 
for scraps of jade at open-face pits – have little benefited from jadeite extractions. Besides, 
hundreds of migrant miners have constantly been killed by deadly landslides when 
improperly dumped waste soil (pit) collapsed (Guardian, 2015a; Htwe, 2018). ‘Freelance 
miners’ always face human rights abuses and have constantly been shot by the local 
authority, police forces and soldiers (DVB, 2017; AFP, 2017).  
These tragedies and discontents frequently lead local people to protest the government 
and companies. For example, February 2016, hundreds of residents from three villages in the 
Hpakant Township protested against mining companies because of the companies’ dumped 
waste soil (Mizzima, 2016). On 28 February 2018, thousands of Kachin people allied at 
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Manau Park, Myitkyina, (see Picture B: at appendices) and marched toward the government 
office, chanting the slogans such as “To enact newly Gems bill”, “No mega mining plots”, 
“To control heavy machinery”, “To stop 24-hour use machinery”, “To issue gems license to 
the citizens”, “To clean environ” and “To keep safety for jade hunters” (KLN, 2018a).  
The protest fueled toward local people from Hpakant – where jade stones have been 
mined and protested again on 19 March 2018 (Min, 2018). These demonstrations aim to get 
opportunities for local people and freelance miners to access the resources and to amend the 
Gems bill in order to bring the benefits for the residents.  
In fact, the Kachin State deposits highly valuable jade and generates multimillion 
dollars from jade mining, but the state per se is poor with dire infrastructure and even had no 
opportunity to hold  ‘Gem Emporium’ for high quality until March 2018. The state had been 
allowed to hold gem emporium only C and D types of gemstones which are lower quality. 
Higher quality: ‘A and B’ types of gemstones have been only exposed in Gem Emporiums in 
Mandalay and Naypyidaw, the capital of Myanmar. After years of people’s demand and 
protests, the government eventually allowed the Kachin State to hold its first gem emporium 
for all types of gemstones in March 2018 in Myitkyina, the capital city, (Oo, 2018).   
The questions arise from these protests that “who benefit from resource extraction and 
how much and how? Answering these questions is important to understand mining jade in 
Hpakant.  
Before the “Ceasefire Agreement” between Tatmadaw and Kachin Independence 
Organization (KIO) was made in 1994, Hpakant jade mining was little known and only 
hundreds of people went for mining jade. The fact was that the fighting between Tatmadaw 
and KIO constantly erupted in Hpakant due to the contesting to control the area. In this 
period, a small-scale mining was done by hands and only small companies worked with 
lighter machinery.  
However, the political situation was changed by signing the Ceasefire Agreement 
between Tatmadaw and the KIO in 1994, after Tatmadaw pushed the KIO far away from 
mining areas. Tatmadaw consolidated a control of the Kachin State’s valuable resources and 
its conglomerate the UMEHL began parceling the mining area into a block and granted them 
to companies. Consequently, state-licensed companies have squeezed the small-scale miners 
who previously mined the areas and heavy machinery was deployed to carry out large-scale 




❖ Who is benefiting? 
There are many jade companies that may have benefited revenues from the jade 
business. However, Global Witness (2015, p.40) has identified four major groups that have 
been benefiting from jade extraction. These major groups are;  
1) Military Generals and Ruling Party  
The military has been involving in jade extraction since the 1990s. Senior General 
Than Shwe – a dictator of Myanmar - is the main person who gained the biggest rent from 
jade extraction. After two decades of the direct military rule, he eventually handed power to 
the elected government in 2011. At the same time, his position – Commander-in-Chief – was 
given to his loyal Min Aung Hlaing. Many believe that Than Shwe still retains considerable 
power via his influence over Tatmadaw and is guiding Myanmar’s transition from behind the 
scenes. The Guardian (2015b) writes “Than Shwe has no official role. But though he has 
been out of the public eye since 2011, many in Myanmar are convinced he remains politically 
involved behind the scenes.” 
Gen. Than Shwe's family involves several business sectors in Myanmar’s economy. 
For example, Than Shwe’s two sons – Htun Naing Shwe and Kyaing San Shwe – own two 
companies called “Myanmar Naing Group and Kyaing International Company”. These 
companies do several business sectors such as construction, export and import, and natural 
resources. These companies have obtained licenses to six jade mines and the mining licenses 
were handed by the Ministry of Mines without any of the usual procedures being followed 
(Global Witness, 2015, p.41). These two companies own another company called “Kywe Wa 
Sone” which was registered under its English name Richest Gems. The company has 
obtained a further three jade mines and is run by Win (ibid). See figure 6.3 in order to see the 
bigger picture of Than Shwe’s family’s involvement in jade extraction (See Picture C: at 
appendices for a list of Than Shwe family’s business).  
Global Witness investigated other ex-military officers who benefit huge amount of 
money from jade extraction. These people are Ohn Myint, Maung Maung Thein, and Phone 
Swe. Ohn Myint, a retired general and former minister of Livestock, Fisheries and Rural 
Development Ministry, has long exercised considerable influence over source extraction such 
as amber, jade, gold and other (Global Witness, 2015). He was appointed as the Northern 
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Commander – the top general in Kachin State in 2005 and he then was promoted Lt. General 
and the Commander of the Bureau of Special Operations-1, which oversees Kachin, northern 
Shan, and Kayah states. When he was in the Northern Command in Kachin State, Ohn Myint 
had exceptional power over the administration and regulated economic activities, for 
example, giving business licenses within Kachin State. Many believed that Ohn Myint 
closely worked with Chinese resource extraction companies and their cozy tie led a large 
influx of Chinese people into Kachin State (Callahan, 2007, p.43). His family owns Myanmar 
Win Gate Gems and Jewellery Mining Co. Ltd and his son Kyaw Thiha and Kyaw Thiha’s 
wife Daw Nway Ei Ei Zin hold 70 percent of the company’s shares (Global Witness, 2015, 
p.44).  
Maung Maung Thein, a retired military general, former Minister for Minister of 
Fisheries and former General Secretary of the USDP party, controlled two jade mining 
companies namely “Myat Yamon” and “Myo Nwe” which generated eye-watering sums of 
money (Global Witness, 2015, p.46). Phone Swe, a retired military general and former 
Deputy Minister for Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement own Shwe Inna Gems 
Company. Win Than, a retired military general and former Deputy Minister for 
Communications and Information Technology, was the sole shareholder of Myanmar 
Imperial Jade (Gems & Jewelry) Co. Ltd, which is MEHL’s main jade-mining and trading 
subsidiary (ibid, p.49).  
 
2) Military’s companies 
Military’s a giant conglomerate: Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) involve 
in mining jade. After signing ceasefire agreement between the military and Kachin 
Independence Organization in 1994, the MEHL came involved in jade mining in 1995. The 
MEHL helped itself to large tracts of the best jade land, whereas other mining companies 
worked as its subcontractors (ibid, p.50).  
The MEHL works through joint venture partners such as the Chinese companies, Xie 
Family Company, Myanmar Win Gate, Jing Hpaw Aung, and other. The production split 
with its partners is generally 20-40% for the MEHL and 60-80 % for the partners (ibid, p.51). 
Other military companies: Myanmar Economic Corporation, Shwe Innwa Gems, Northern 
Star Gems also involve in jade extraction. The MEHL annually organize a jade auction in 




3) Crony Companies 
Cronyism is not a new phenomenon across many countries including Myanmar. 
Myanmar’s ‘crony’ tycoons with connections to the military generals, political elites, and the 
highest levels of the ruling elites have economic power which enables them to influence on 
socio-economic affairs (Ford et al., 2016). They also have close connections with military 
generals via intermarriage of their sons and daughters. For instance, a business tycoon Khin 
Shwe’s daughter is married to former general Shwe Mann’s son. 
There are many cronies who own a number of major jade companies, but only a few 
are visibly known. The Global Witness (2015) has identified some of the most visible and 
giant companies: Ever Winner, KBZ Group, Asia World, and Htoo Group. 
The Ever Winner is believed to controls and benefits from some most valuable assets 
in Kachin State (ibid). According to the Global Witness’ investigation, Aike Htwe is the 
owner of the company and his five daughters are key players in the jade business. Ever 
Winner is a web of companies with different names. There is a dozen of Ever Winner 
companies active in jade extraction and the use of a range of names under Ever Winner is to 
cover the scale of the Ever Winner group’s control of the jade business. 
KBZ (Kanbawza) Group, owned by business tycoon Aung Ko Win, is one of the 
biggest companies in Myanmar. Many believe that Aung Ko Win was used to work for 
Maung Aye – the second most powerful military general of the junta. KBZ Group owns many 
firms: Nilayoma Co. Limited, Myanmar Billion Group, East Yoma Co. Limited and Cigarette 
Company and Bank. Today KBZ bank is the most successful bank in Myanmar. KBZ Group 
involves not only in Hpakant’s jade extraction but also in Hkamti mines, a deposit in Sagaing 
Division and Mong Hsu’s ruby mines in Shan State (Global Witness, 2015).  
Asia World owned by Lo Hsing-Han and his son Steven Law is another of 
Myanmar’s largest companies. Asia World is known for its partnership with the state-owned 
China Power Investment (CPI) in building the controversial Myitsone Dam hydropower 
project which former President Thein Sein suspended in 2011 (Beech, 2011). Yadanar Taung 
Tann and Shwe Taung Company are under the Asia World Company. Yadanar Taung Tann 
Gems controlled the best jade plots such as Gwi Hka area, south of Hpakant and Met Lin 
Chaung, west of Hpakant town (Global Witness, 2015).  
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Htoo Group owned by Tay Za who used to have a close relationship with former junta 
Than Shwe and was listed Myanmar’s number one business tycoon. Htoo Group carried out 
several key projects on behalf of Tatmadaw, for example, the purchase of weapons, military 
equipment, aircraft and ships (Treasury, 2018). Htoo Group controls several jade mines and 
has sold some of them to Wa’s firms (Global Witness, 2015).  
 
4) Ceasefire groups 
Some ethnic armed groups particularly the United Wa State Army, Pa-O National 
Organization, and Kachin Independence Organization, that signed the ceasefire agreements 
with the military regime have also benefited the revenues from the jade business. Due to 
signing the ceasefire agreements, these groups were awarded business concessions by the 
military regime. I will discuss further detail in Chapter 7, section 2. 
 
❖ How much they benefit? 
All business companies ranging from Than Shwe’s family to ceasefire groups benefits 
a whopping amount of money from jade businesses. According to the data collected by the 
Global Witness (see Table 1), the military benefited the highest amount of jade sales in 2013 
and 2014.  
Table 1: Data of Jade Business Companies’ Benefits 
 




All in all, jade business is virtually under control of the military regime and the 
military generals, their families and relatives, political elites, business cronies and some 
ethnic armed groups benefit a whopping amount of incomes.  
 
6.1.2. Gold 
Myanmar is referred as the ‘Golden Land’ due to rich gold domiciled in many regions 
and as gold is used for Buddhist religious purposes. Estimates of Myanmar's gold production 
is 54 400 Troy Oz or 1692 kg per year, which accounts 70% of Asia’s gold markets 
(Norwegian Embassy, 2017; RGN, 2015). There are several regions, i.e. Sagaing and 
Tanintharyi Regions and Shan and Mon States, that host gold and gold mines, but the Kachin 
State, northern Myanmar, produces a major portion of gold which is mainly consumed in the 
domestic market and international markets via China.  
In Kachin State, there are some gold mining areas: Hugawng Valley, Mali Hka 
(Irrawaddy River) and Mine Naung gold mines. Before 1994, a small-scale gold mining was 
done by Kachin villagers on dry land, on riversides, and underwater by using simple tools: 
sieves, spades, buckets, and iron bars (KDNG, 2007, p.15). After signing the ceasefire 
agreement between Tatmadaw and KIO in 1994, Tatmadaw granted licenses to private 
companies backed by Chinese and local investors. A gold mining changed from a small-scale 
local livelihood to a large-scale business venture with heavy machinery imported from China. 
Large gold mining companies pay for concessions from the regime’s Ministry of Mines to 
mine for gold in a given area for a given amount of time, but Northern Regional Commander 
oversaw the gold mining (ibid, p.24).  
The largest gold mining in Kachin State is in Hugawng Valley, the western part of 
Kachin State, in Indo-Myanmar border. It has been internationally recognized as one of the 
world’s hotspots of biodiversity and the US-based Wildlife Conservation Society has 
established the world’s largest tiger reserve in the valley (Walsh, 2010). The Hugawng valley 
was largely untouched by the military regime until the mid-1990s, but it has become a host of 
gold mining industry after the 1994 ceasefire agreement between the military and the KIO 




The biggest gold mining companies include Sea Sun Star Co., Ltd., Northern Star Co., 
Ltd.,  BUGA Co., Ltd., Twe Co., Ltd., Yaung Che Oo Shwe Thu Phaw Yae Co., Ltd., and 
Yadana Hein Co., Ltd (ibid, p.62). These companies hold the concessions from the Ministry 
of Mine and no individuals or companies can mine for gold in these areas unless they pay 
taxes to the concession holders. These companies must pay 35-50% from their profits to the 
military and take care of travel expenses, food, and accommodation on special occasions 
when ministry officials, the Northern Commander, or other authorizes visit (ibid, 24).  
Many other companies, for example, Kha Ka Bo Mining Company alike, mine gold in 
Mine Naung near the Inndaw Gyi Lake in Monyin District, the Irrawaddy River, and other 
areas. Unsurprisingly, the 18 percent of Kachin state has become a gold mining area (RFA, 
n.d.). Larger gold mining companies obtain the concessions from Myanmar’s Ministry of 
Mine, but smaller companies, for instance, a Chinese company, obtain the concessions from 
the Military’s Northern Commanders. Yet there is no official data about gold mining 
business, for instance, who get and how much from the gold business, the military 
commanders, however, might gain substantial benefits from gold extraction since the military 
has so far provided a security for the gold mining companies and the gold mines are guarded 
by the military’s troops (KLN, 2018b, Burmalink, n.d).  
Due to an entry of giant companies in gold mining companies, local people who do 
small-scale gold mining by using simple tools have lost their livelihood and suffered from 
environmental and health impacts of gold mining. The local people thus sometimes protest 
against the government, calling to halt gold mining operations (Mekongeye, 2017; Aung, 
2017). In fact, gold mining has also become an income generator for Tatmadaw and gold 
mining companies whereas local people have little benefited from gold mining.  
 
6.1.3. Amber 
Amber, precious stones, posits in Kachin State, has made headlines in newspapers 
across the planet due to the discovery of the world’s first preserved dinosaur tail embedded 
inside a chunk of amber (FP, 2017).  Before the discovery of this rare amber in Myanmar, 
Baltic and Caribbean amber dominated the amber market (Ripper and Yang, 2017).  
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In 2015, scientists revealed a new species of extinct predatory cockroaches that lived 
alongside the dinosaurs for the 100 million years from amber unearthed from Tanai, Kachin 
State (Vršanský, 2015). In 2016, Lida Xing from the China University of Geosciences in 
Beijing discovered the tail of a feathered dinosaur preserved in the 99-million-year-old amber 
at an amber market in Kachin State, Myanmar (Rincon, 2016). Other types of amber, for 
example, spider, “dino-bird” tail, have been unearthed from Tanai (see Picture D at 
appendices).    
Myanmar’s amber and other natural resources are exported to Yunnan Province, 
China. Yunnan’s Tengchong, Ruili, Jinjiang, Dali, and Je Gau become marketplaces for 
Myanmar’s gemstones (Rippa and Yang, 2017). In those markets, buyers from different parts 
of the regions such as Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, come and buy 
gemstones (ibid). There are a few buyers from European, Korean and Japan, but virtually all 
of the amber goes to China (ibid; Win, 2015). There is no specific data on amber sales due to 
illegal markets, but a sale of amber is estimated at US$ 1 billion a year since even fossil 
amber easily fetch approximately US$100,000 (FP, 2017).  
Yet there is no an official data on amber business: who involves in amber extraction, 
who gives concessions, how much do they earn, who controls the amber mines, and how 
much do they pay for taxes.  But the military is believed to have gained substantial revenues 
from the amber business through taxes, payments, and fees collected at the military 
gates/checkpoints. All ambers are carried by cars from Tanai to Myitkyina – Waimaw – 
Kanpaiti to Yunnan Province, China. To reach China, amber traders must pass several 
military gates or checkpoints and they have to pay the rate according to the values or tons of 
amber. 
Tatmadaw, moreover, wanted to control all amber mining areas, thus they started the 
clearance operation against the KIA that had controlled some parts of the amber-rich territory 
in 2017. The operation has driven out many mining workers and local residents. Even Mr. U 
Lin Lin Oo who is a lawmaker from Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw) criticized the military’s 
operation on illegal gold and amber mines in Tanai region, simply saying that “The Ministry 
of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation and the Kachin State government 
should take the lead in handling this problem. Military action is not at all the right approach” 
(Pwint, 2017). It is very obvious that Tatmadaw is keen to take a control over the amber 




 Due to Tatmadaw’s blockage of roadways in the amber mining region, it is now 
difficult for amber miners to access the mining sites (RFA, 2018a). The military now controls 
all amber mining regions and has pushed back the KIA from the mining area and they will 
further benefit the rents from the amber business in the future.  
 
6.2. Oil and Gas 
Myanmar is one of the world’s oldest oil producers and is the 10th largest producer of 
natural gas globally (Mudditt, 2014). Myanmar holds 3.2 billion barrels of oil reserves and 18 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. It produced 16.8 billion cubic meters of natural gas 
in 2014 alone and gas accounted for approximately 30% of total exports in 2014 (NRGI, 
2016a). Myanmar’s gas has served as the government’s main source of foreign exchange 
(ibid).  
The country per se, however, gains a small percentage of revenues from oil and gas 
sales. According to the World Bank data (See Figure 4), the percentage of Myanmar’s oil 
rents to GDP has substantially decreased from 2.6% in 2005 to 0.1% in 2015. This trend 
shows us the percentages have been decreasing tremendously.   
 
Figure 4: Myanmar’s Oil Rents (% of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank 
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Similarly, the country gains a small percent of the revenues from natural gas sector 
though it has produced billion cubic meters of natural gas. The percentage of natural gas rent 
to GDP has also declined from 2.5% in 2006 to 0.8% in 2015 (See Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Myanmar’s Natural Gas Rents (% of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
The question arises from these statistics: why the revenues from oil and gas 
extractions are considerably low though the country extracts billions of cubic meters and 
barrels of oil and gas. It is not easy to answer this question. But we can draw some 
assumptions and conclusions by analyzing the oil and gas business.  
The Ministry of Energy is responsible to tender and grant a license to extract oil and 
gas in Myanmar. They also manage concession contracts, exploration & production and sale 
of oil and gas. The state-owned enterprise, Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), is the 
main player to conduct all exploration, production, and transportation of oil and gas in 
onshore and offshore areas (NRGI, 2016b). The MOGE not only supervises mapping for the 
oil and gas sector and provides detailed maps of all oil and gas blocks, but also sets 
procedures for bidding and licensing (ibid, p.20). However, a unified legal framework for oil 
and gas licensing is opaque and the criteria used to award permits were unclear (ibid).  
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In 2014, when Myanmar awarded 36 new blocks to foreign companies in onshore and 
offshore bid rounds, the bid attracted new international companies such as Woodside, Shell, 
BG, Eni, and Statoil (ibid; Mudditt, 2014). In fact, Myanmar’s oil and gas have naturally 
drawn China’s attention earlier as China’s economy rapidly grow and quest for energy 
sources abroad has expanded. China started its presence in Myanmar’s oil and gas fields by 
signing six contracts on production sharing with the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise 
(MOGE) of the Ministry of Energy in 2004 (Kudo, 2006, p.16). The China Petroleum and 
Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC), the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), 
and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) have vigorously started to invest in 
oil and gas sectors in Myanmar. The biggest project was PetroChina’s a gas pipeline from 
Kyukphyu, the Shwe field off the coast of Rakhine State, Myanmar to Yunnan Province, 
China. The PetroChina signed a memorandum of understanding with MOGE to buy gas from 
the block for thirty years starting from 2009 (ibid, p.17).  
When Chinese President Xi Jinping launched “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) 
initiative in 2013, Myanmar’s oil and gas become a vital importance for the OBOR project. 
One of OBOR Corridors: India-Bangladesh-Myanmar-China Economic Corridor is designed 
to connect China with South Asia, running from Yunnan (China), Myanmar and Bangladesh 
to India (Barisitz and Radzyner, 2017, p.15).  See the map of Myanmar-China Shwe Gas 
pipelines at Map B: at appendices.  
The Chinese-Myanmar pipelines which started operation in April 2017, avoiding the 
Strait of Malacca - a narrow channel that connects the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean – 
and has a designed annual transmission capacity of 22 million tons of oil and 13 billion cubic 
meters of gas (Xin, 2017). The pipelines project comprises the construction of parallel 
pipelines for transporting crude oil and natural gas from Kyaukpyu, the Rakhine State to 
Yunnan Province, China. The estimated investment on the pipeline project is US$2.54 
billion, including US$1.5 billion for the oil pipeline and US$1.04 billion for the gas pipeline 
(Hongwei, 2012).  
Chinese government has promised to pay up to USD 1.8 billion on average annually 
in royalties over 30 years to Myanmar (Meyer, 2015). In return, the military guarantees the 
safety of the pipeline route by deploying approximately 28 battalions from the Rakhine State 
to China border (Earthrights, 2011, p.5). The military has committed a series of human rights 
abuses, for example, forced relocation and forced labor for the sake of providing security for 
the project (ibid). Therefore, the SHWE Gas Movement and other rights groups have asked 
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both Myanmar and Chinese governments including corporations to halt the project until there 
is assurance that Myanmar’s people can participate in the decision-making process and 
benefit from this project (Shwe, n.d).  
Chinese investors claim that both benefits from the pipelines as Myanmar will enjoy 
lucrative dividends for the next 30 years and as China has already supplied gas to three 
Chinese provinces – Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi – and other counties and cities (Yuan, 
2017). However, it is opaque that who gains the annual payment US$ 1. 8 billion from China 
because the local people have not yet gained even adequate compensation, but lost their lands 
due to land confiscation and faced human rights abuses by the military that lead them to a 
mass demonstration (RFA, 2018b).  
 
6.3. Logging Forest  
Myanmar’s primary products include many natural resources, amongst which is 
forestry. The revenues from logging forest also contribute to Myanmar’s GDP. According to 
the World Bank database, Myanmar’s revenue from forestry contributes 3.62 percent of its 
GDP which is the second largest portion amongst ASEAN countries (see Figure 6).  
Figure 6: ASEAN’s Forest Rents (% of GDP) in 2016 
 
Source: World Bank: world development indicators 
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Exporting forest products has increased over time in Myanmar. It has projected (see 
Figure 7) to export progressively from 260 000 cubic tons of teak and 990 000 cubic tons of 
hardwood in 2011/2012 to 320 000 cubic tons of teak and 1 050 000 cubic tons of hardwood 
in 2030/2031 (Htun, 2009, p.41).  
Figure 7: Projected teak and hardwood production 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Htun (2009)’s statistics 
Nevertheless, actual productions for teak and hardwood have already exceeded targets 
(ibid; MNPED, 2006). Myanmar has lost more than 546,000 hectares of forest on average 
each year since 2010 (Phyu, 2015). See the photo of logging forest at Picture E: at 
appendices. According to the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), Myanmar’s illegal 
log exports are worth nearly US$ 6 billion a year (The Ecologist, 2014; Doherty, 2014). This 
value does not include an official data and will not become the state’ revenue.  
The question arises “who involve in these legal and illegal log businesses and how?” 
It is by no means easy to identify who really control the logging businesses. However, 
analyzing the recent logging activities can give us a clue to understanding the logging empire.  
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation oversees the planning 
and production of teak, timber, hardwood and other forest products. The state-owned 
enterprise Myanmar Timber Enterprise4 fully involves in the logging business and other 
                                                          




domestic private companies5 such as Myanmar Forest Products & Timber Merchants 
Association, Forest Products Joint Venture Corporation Ltd., and other business cronies’ 
companies and international companies like Almtra Nordic take participation in the logging 
business. In November 2016, the timber company Almtra Nordic was ruled by a Swedish 
Administrative Courts as guilty of violating the EU Timber Regulation by importing 
Myanmar teak illegally (Saunders, 2016).  
The profits from logging timbers reach a much wider range of beneficiaries such as 
the military officials, ethnic armed groups, business cronies, and Chinese businessmen, 
(Hammond, 2015). However, the military is the key player in logging timbers as they grant a 
concession to a range of interest groups and involves itself in logging business in many ways. 
The UK based Global Witness (2003, p.10) states that “Tatmadaw units are involved in 
logging on several levels: conducting logging operations themselves, transporting illegal 
timber, using forced labor, giving permission to log, and taxing legal and illegal log cutting 
and transportation.”  
The military’s regional and local commanders have the ultimate power to take control 
not only in the logging business but also in other frontier businesses.  Woods (2011, p.754) 
also states that “…the granting of a logging concession by the northern military commander 
to a Chinese company concomitantly reconfigures the political territory where the concession 
is located, precisely closing off other non-state authorities’ access and use of that resource.” 
Myanmar’s regional commanders are very powerful and control over business sectors 
regionally. The position of Regional Commander can be a route to the military central office 
and Srn. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander-in-Chief of Tatmadaw, for instance, used to 
be a Commander of the Triangle Regional Command in the eastern Shan state. These 
regional commanders pay their loyalty to Commander-in-Chief; they, in return, are promoted 
into higher ranks and position (Global Witness, 2003, p.26).  
The military regime also provides a concession and allowed a range of ethnic armed 
groups, for instance, KIO, BGF, and militias in Kachin State, NMSP in Mon State, DKBA, 
KNU and BGF in Karen State, and RCSS in Shan State, to log timber and other hardwoods 
(Brenner, 2014; Woods, 2011 and 2013; Weng, 2009). For example, in Kachin State alone, 
an illegal log trade reaches $600 million a year (Wadley, 2015). But the military and some of 
the ethnic armed groups have sometimes clashed due to the contesting over the black market 
logging trade (Holland, 2014).  
                                                          
5 There is a list of other timber companies: https://www.company-list.org/myanmar/timber/ 
38 
 
The military also benefits the revenues from logging timbers via business cronies. 
Ferrie (2014, p.1) also states that “Myanmar's former military rulers relied on tycoons like 
Tay Za to prop up the economy. Commonly known as the cronies, they became experts at 
circumventing sanctions and were richly rewarded by the junta, which granted concessions 
ranging from forestry to car imports.”  
All in all, the military is well known to usurp resources such as jade, gold, amber, oil 
and gas and timber from areas around its bases (Global Witness, 2003, p.28). The military 
has benefited a whopping amount of money from natural resource extractions that become a 
major incentive and tool for them to control the economy.  
 
Chapter 7: Purposes and Consequences of Resource Control    
 The thesis now gives an answer to the hypotheses by analyzing the purposes and 
consequences of the military’s resource control. In this section, I will give a short discussion 
how Tatmadaw uses the natural resource as their political power-game, and what are the 
consequences of its resource grab.  
 
7.1. Hypothesis 1: Resource Curse More Than A Blessing 
“The abundance of natural resources is a barrier and not an incentive to economic transition 
towards prosperous entrepreneurial society in Myanmar.” 
▪ Dutch Disease  
In a Dutch Disease Model, if the country experiences the greater the natural resource 
endowment, the lower is the demand for non-tradable goods. Consequently, the 
manufacturing sector tends to shrink and the tradable goods sector tends to expand. 
Myanmar’s manufacturing sector has shrunk due to the country was dependent on natural 
resources. According to the World Economic Forum (see Figure 8), Myanmar’s institutions, 
infrastructure, innovation and financial market etc. are below that of emerging countries 





Figure 8: Myanmar: Relative Competitiveness 2015-2016 
 
Source: WEF – Global Competitiveness Report 2015-16 
 
The natural resource sector booms but the remaining sectors lag behind. The whole 
economy suffers from the secular stagnation since the natural resource sector development 
has clear physical barriers to expansion while the rest of the economy is constrained by 
economic conditions (low profits, poor access to credit lines, low domestic demand).  
For instance, the contribution of Myanmar’s banking sector to the economy is limited 
and the banking asset to GDP ratio is 49% which is the lowest compared to its peer countries, 
(Chassat & Foerster, 2016). In Myanmar’s banking sector, foreign banks that have strong 
equity base are restricted by the Central Bank of Myanmar6 from lending loans to local 
businesses though the state-owned banks have limited capabilities and private banks lack the 
critical scale (ibid; Htike, 2014).  The banks of Myanmar charge 13 percent interest rate on 
loans, which are the second largest in the ASEAN countries (see Figure 9). Not only is 
                                                          
6 It is not clear whether the Central Bank of Myanmar is now independently operated by itself since it has been 
under the direct military control for many years.  
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interest rate high, but also borrowers must show collateral for loans which have put 
businesses in a difficult position (Aung, 2017).  
 
Figure 9: Myanmar’s Lending Interest Rate 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Moreover, Myanmar’s economy has been slammed by high inflation for many years. 
The inflation occurs due to rising food prices, the depreciation of Myanmar’s currency 
‘Kyat’, and higher import prices (Kyaw, 2015). Higher inflation has weakened the purchasing 
power of the kyat. Myanmar’s kyat has lost its strength against the US dollar and has driven 
down the competitiveness of Myanmar’s exports.  
Indeed, Myanmar’s inflation is the highest amongst the ASEAN countries (see Figure 
10). According to the World Bank, Myanmar’s inflation rate has risen from 5.8 percent in 
2015 to 6.9 percent in 2016. It is a result of mismanagement of monetary operations by the 
Central Bank, for example, an inflexibility of the exchange rate and lack of ability to 




Figure 10: Myanmar’s Inflation in 2016 
 
Source: World Bank 
Consequently, Myanmar suffers from debt overhang and repaying debts becomes a 
challenge for Myanmar government. The Paris Club canceled $5.925 billion, Norway 
canceled all the $534 million and Japan wrote off more than $3 billion of Myanmar debts in 
2013, but Myanmar still owes approximately USD $9 billion (Reuters, 2013: Htwe, 2017). 
According to the IMF, Myanmar’s debt in 2018 is around 39000 billion kyat which is the 
estimated 35.75% of its GDP (see Figure 11).  
Figure 11: Myanmar’s General Government Gross Debt 
 
Source: IMF (2017) 
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Myanmar’s major creditors are China approximately with US$3.96 billion, which is 
44 percent of its total foreign debts, the Paris Club with US$3.3 billion and to countries under 
the Paris Club, and international organizations like the Asia Development Bank and the 
World Bank (Htwe, 2017).  
 
▪ Rentier Effects 
As Ross (2001) argues that the “'rentier effect’: Taxation, Spending, and Group 
Formation Effects,” may occur if the military regime earns direct and considerable revenues 
from resource extraction. The revenues from resource extraction reduce the need for the 
regime to tax the population, spend on patronage to mitigate dissents and prevent the 
formation of social or special interest groups. 
Myanmar proves this argument as the regime has taxed a lower tax rate on its citizens. 
Since the country has earned the revenues from the resource extraction, Myanmar tax rate has 
the lowest tax-to-GDP ratio in ASEAN and one of the lowest in the world, at 8 percent in 
2016 (see Figure 12).  
Figure 12: Myanmar’s Tax Revenue in 2016 
 
Source: World Bank 
43 
 
The percentages used to be even worse in the previous years under the direct military 
rulers. In 2011, the government collected less than 4% of GDP and by 2016 government 
revenue had more than doubled (The Economist, 2017). The revenues from resource 
extraction reduce the need for the military regime to tax the population.  
The military earns the rent from resources which enable them to spend in patronage 
and mitigate dissents. For example, in 2012, the military and its patronage ‘police force’ 
severely cracked down on protestors, villagers and Buddhist monks, who protested the 
expansion of the Chinese Wanbao Copper Mine Company, a joint venture of the military’s 
UMEHL in Letpadaung, Sagaing Division, Myanmar (Marshall, 2012). Myanmar’s police 
forces who take the security for the military joint ventures ‘jade mining companies’ in 
Phakant constantly shoot mining workers (Coconuts, 2016, Mizzima, 2017).  
 
▪ Repression Effects 
The revenues from resource extraction allow the military regime to spend on internal 
security and block the population’s political demands. Although citizens want political 
changes or democracy, the regime represses them by spending a huge amount of money on 
internal security. According to the World Bank database, Myanmar’s military expenditure is 
the largest amongst ASEAN countries (see Figure 13).  
Figure 13: Myanmar’s Military Expenditure in 2016 
 
Source: World Bank 
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Myanmar’s military spending has been opaque for many years since budgets were not 
published at all for many years. However, Bunte (2017) calculates the military’s spending 
based on the data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (see Table 2).  
Table 2: Myanmar’s Military Spending 
 
Source: Bunte (2017) 
 
The military spending has seen a steady rise since 2011. In 2013, Myanmar's military 
was granted a $3.2 billion annual budget, just over 16 percent of total government spending 
in the poverty-stricken country (Chiang Rai Times, 2013). Furthermore, a special fund law 
enacted in 2011 makes it possible for the military to access additional funds without 
parliamentary oversight (Selth, 2015, p.11, Bunte, 2017, p.116).  The increase in military 
spending can be interpreted as a tool to suppress not only the ethnic minorities but also to 
civilians who demand changes.  
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It is incontrovertible that the natural resources are major incentives for the military to 
remain in the economy since the revenues from resource extraction can be easily expropriated 
within a narrow group of political insiders and spent in their political purposes. And people 
who are linked with the military can benefit from natural resource extraction. But a super 
majority of the citizens of Myanmar lives in a severe standard of living. Myanmar’s 
abundance of a natural resource is thus a curse for ordinary citizens more than a blessing 
since they live in abject poverty among a land of profitable reserves.  
 
7.2. Hypothesis 2: Demobilization through Business Concessions 
“Natural resource is an important tool of the military to demobilize ethnic armed groups by 
granting business concessions that become a part of a continued military power-game, which 
crowd out the need of economic reforms and market-driven social development.” 
Tatmadaw has used the natural resource as a ceasefire capitalism to mitigate conflict, 
demobilize groups, build political coalitions as business concessions to the ethnic armed 
groups to transform Border Guard Force (BFP), militias and sign ceasefire agreements. 
Woods (2011, p.751) also states that “Ceasefire capitalism is meant to capture the particular 
modes of finance, landscape production, governance, and military–state formation within 
ceasefire spaces that together co-emerge over time.” 
Myanmar has several ethnic armed groups that have signed ceasefire agreements with 
the military, transformed the Border Guard Force (BGF) and militias. An integral part of 
these agreements was to give the ethnic groups economic concessions and the control of 
natural resources (Global Witness, 2003, p.9).  These groups are all believed to hold business 
assets—particularly involving natural resource extraction—in their territories.  
I will give three ethnic armed groups that have gained business concessions from the 
military regime as an example. These groups are the United Wa State Army, Pa-O National 
Organization, and Kachin Independence Organization.  
▪ United Wa State Army (UWSA)  
After signing the bilateral ceasefire agreement in 1989 and 2011, the UWSA controls 
jade mines in Hpakant Township, Kachin State through its former financial affairs chief and 
drug lord Wei Hsueh Kang (Global Witness, 2015, p.62). Wei Hsueh Kang’s jade company is 
exceptionally powerful by using the UWSA name. Wei Hsueh Kang is a beneficial owner of 
46 
 
other small companies. Wei Hsueh Kang normally coerces other jade companies to come 
under the UWSA-associated umbrella by making threats and using lawsuits to harass other 
companies (ibid, p.66). The UWSA benefits huge amount of revenues from jade business 
through Wei Hsueh Kang and his jade businesses.  
▪ Pa-O National Organization (PNO) 
The PNO signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) along with other seven 
armed groups in 2015 under the previous government led by the then President Thein Sein. 
The group had a former ceasefire agreement made in 1991 and this agreement earned 
business concessions from the military. The PNO’s business company dubbed Ruby Dragon 
has become a prominent player in the jade and ruby industries (ibid, p.67). The Ruby Dragon 
diversifies its business from jade extraction to manufacturing and hospitality. The group 
earns a significant revenue stream from jade extraction.  
▪ Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) 
The KIO also benefits from jade extraction through its own company called ‘BUGA 
Company Limited’ and taxation. After signing the ceasefire agreement with the military in 
1994, the military junta did not allow the KIO to collect tax in its controlled areas but granted 
permission to the BUGA Company Limited to do some businesses.  
The KIO relied heavily on precious jade for its funding and the BUGA became a 
major income generator for the KIO. The BUGA Company Limited ran several businesses 
ranging from jade business to mining gold, to logging timber, to running sugar factory and 
giving electricity through its hydropower. The BUGA bought the sugar factory from the 
military regime for an estimated US$150,000 (Kumbun, 2017).  
After the KIO refused to transform into the Border Guard Force in 2011, the military 
regime restricted not only the KIO’s businesses but also stymied BUGA Company Limited in 
doing businesses, particularly in jade business.The KIO then renewed collecting taxes over 
jade companies in Hpakant in December 2010 (KNG, 2010). According to the ceasefire pact, 
the KIO did not collect tax in the military-controlled areas, but they started collecting taxes in 
Hpakant.  
These ceasefire groups have benefited substantial revenues from the natural resource 
extraction particularly from jade business. The UWSA and PNO have gained the highest 
amount of revenues from jade business (see Table 3).  
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Table 3: Data of Jade Business Ceasefire Groups’ Benefits 
 
Source: Global Witness (2015) 
In this table, there is no data of the KIO’s benefits, but the KIO also benefits from a 
jade business via collecting taxes. According to the Global Witness, many of bigger 
companies each paid over between US$ 100,000 and US$ 500,000. The KIO collected over 
US$ 20 million from the companies in January 2012 alone (Global Witness, 2015, p. 92).  
Indeed, there are many other ceasefire groups that have gained business concessions 
from the military and run numerous businesses such as logging forest and mining jade, gold, 
amber, ruby and coal, and imported cars. When delivering a speech at the Union Parliament 
to mark the first anniversary of his new government taking office, a former President Thein 
Sein said that ethnic armed groups should “swap guns for laptops” (Naing, 2012). In the 
sense that ethnic armed groups should disarm and take advantages what the government 
offers to them. Thus, the natural resources become a typical tool for the military to 
demobilize ethnic armed organizations.  
 
7.3. Hypothesis 3: Resource War 
“Natural resources partially trigger and fuel to civil war between the military and ethnic 
armed groups due to contesting resource grabs.” 
The military’s recent clearance operation against the KIO underlines the visibility of 
resource war. The military has been attempting to control amber-cum-gold rich areas in 
Kachin State by conducting its ‘clearance operation’. On 5 June 2017,  the military 
helicopters dropped leaflets over amber mining areas, ordering amber miners to leave by June 
15 or risk being “considered as cooperating with the terrorist group KIA, the armed wings of 
the KIO (Mon, 2017; Lat, 2017). Then, on 4 August 2017, Maj. Hlaing Phyu – a military 
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representative – proposed amber-rich Tanai area as an environmentally protected area in the 
Kachin State parliament (RFA, 2017). The military’s argument was that the KIA had 
benefited through taxes from illegal mining whereas the state government had lost revenues. 
Ten days later on 14 August 2018, Tatmadaw representatives assigned to Parliament (Lower 
House) reiterated its policy to protect amber-rich Tanai and conduct a clearance operation 
against the KIA in line with the 2008 Constitution—without the need for approval from the 
government (Zaw, 2017). The military then started conducting its clearance operation against 
the KIA and the fighting continues and thousands of amber mine workers have fled from the 
mining areas.  
Mark (2018) also writes about the current civil war in Kachin State that “But 
underneath this military operation is actually a ‘resource war’ between the Tatmadaw and the 
KIO in Kachin state. Indeed, control of not only gold and amber but also jade, copper, and 
ruby mines in the area is important for both the Tatmadaw and the KIO.” After several 
months of clearance operation, Tatmadaw has taken a control over the amber-rich region in 
Tanai, whereas the KIA has pulled back from most of its territorial control over the amber 
mines (Weng, 2018).  
Tatmadaw has also targeted its offensive against the KIO in resource-rich territories, 
such as jade-rich Hpakant areas, gold and amber-rich areas in Hugawng valley, logging forest 
in Sino-Myanmar border (KNL, 2012; RFA, 2012; Mizzima, 2017; Fawthrop, 2017a). The 
military’s attempt to control natural resources has led a resource war in Kachin State and 
beyond.  
 
7.4. Hypothesis 4: China’s Resource Hunger  
“China’s resource hunger is conducive to the military to exploit natural resources.” 
China is not only the main importer of Myanmar’s natural resources but also 
Myanmar’s largest trading partners. According to the World Bank, China accounted for 40.84 
percent of Myanmar’s exports in 2016 (WITS, 2016).  
China’s resource need for the project of the One Belt & One Road (OBOR) initiative, 
for factories, for electricity and for feeding millions of populations of Yunnan province, 
Myanmar plays a crucial role to fulfill their needs.  For the OBOR project, China has built 
US$2.54 billion worth parallel pipelines and has been transporting crude oil and natural gas 
from the Rakhine State. Wanbao Copper Mining Company – a subsidiary of the Chinese 
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arms manufacturer Norinco – makes it possible to extract copper. China also built USD 3.6 
billion mega dams in Myitsone in Kachin State, and built Upstream Thanlwin hydropower 
project in Shan State. The former ones have been suspended by the former President Thein 
Sein in 2011, but the later one will have a capacity to generate 7,000 MW a year, but 90% of 
the produced electricity will be exported to China (The Nation, 2014; Fawthrop, 2017a).  
China exports billions of cubic meters of timber, hardwood, Hongmu, and teak from 
Myanmar to fulfill its demand for classical Chinese-style furniture and décor. According to 
the Environmental Investment Agency (EIA), China imports the largest portion of Hongmu 
wood from Myanmar for its Hongmu industry (see Figure 14).  
Figure 14 : China’s Import on Hongmu Log from Myanmar 
 
Source: IEA (2014). 
As China takes away the natural resources from Myanmar as much as they want, 
China, as a quid pro quo, diplomatically protects Myanmar at international arena particularly 
at the UNSC for any punishments on the military (Enze, 2016, p.158). For example, China 
vetoed a UN draft resolution on Myanmar in January 2007 and it also blocked a short UNSC 
statement expressing concern with the situation of human rights in Myanmar in 2017 (UN, 
2007; RFERL, 2017). China’s resource hunger makes it possible for the military to remain in 
the economy by exploiting the natural resources for their own benefits and purposes.  
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Thus, the abundance of natural resources is a major incentive for the military to keep 
in the economy as they can use the natural resource as a tool of their political power-game 
and interest. The natural resource, in fact, is the barrier to the economic transition toward the 
free market system since the military has benefited the revenues from resource extraction and 
used the natural resources as their political interest.  
 
Chapter 8: Possible Solutions 
Tatmadaw’s participation in the economy mainly via controlling the natural resources 
has negated the benefits of the free market system in Myanmar. It is important to cut the 
bloodline of Tatmadaw’s motives, interest, and benefits from the natural resources in order to 
reinvent the free market economy.  
It boils down to three possible solutions: reduce production, making payments more 
transparent and higher taxes, to cope with the military’s control over the natural resources in 
Myanmar.  
 
8.1. Reduce Production  
It is undeniable that aggressive reductions in the natural resource consumption could 
help in reducing prices and hence the flow of money to Tatmadaw. By reducing its total 
resource consumption, consumers particularly China could help both reduce gemstones’ 
prices and undermine the resource-based military. But China will not stop buying and 
exploiting the natural resources from Myanmar as it needs to fulfill the resource hunger.  
Thus, the production of natural resources is an alternative option to mitigate the 
military’s control over the resources. As the level of informality varies between sectors, oil 
and gas are increasingly formalized, whereas informal extraction such as jade, gold, amber, 
and timber has been estimated to vastly exceed formal extraction (Lynn and Oye, 2014). The 
NLD government must address the current illegal extraction and exceed production of the 
natural resources by enacting laws, restricting extraction licenses and controlling the 
companies, enforcing rule of law, and taking action on illegal businesses. The NLD should 
pass legislation that prohibits the military and its patronages such as police and serving 
officers from establishing and operating beneficial ownership over companies. It is 
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appreciable that the NLD government has recently removed import-export restrictions on 
gold and gold products – the restrictions had been imposed by the military regime for many 
years – aiming to regularize the domestic industry and stem the informal trade in gold (Thiha, 
2018).  
If the government cannot reduce the exploitation and production of the natural 
resources as these resources cannot be replanted, the country will end up with nothing except 
beefing up the strength of the military and an extinction of the resources. For example, forests 
– a non-renewable resource - take hundred years to grow a forest for the logging maturity 
while it takes a couple of weeks to turn the forest into a barren clearance (e.g. by a forest 
poaching). Logging forests can become an exceptionally prosperous private business while 
causing enormous social losses to the society at the same time. U Tint Soe, a member of 
Lower House, from Hpakant Township, also expresses that Myanmar’s natural resources, for 
example, jade bounty are disappearing due to a large-scale excavation (Htwe, 2016).  
Therefore, the current civilian government must prevent from exceeding production 
of the natural resource through enacting laws. Controlling the production of the natural 
resources will be conducive to prevent the military from benefiting the revenues from the 
resource sectors which, in turn, can reduce Tatmadaw’s participation in the economy.  
 
8.2. Making Payments More Transparent 
The revenues from the natural resources are obscure since the government discloses 
only “partial” or “scant” information about their resource revenues, particularly its formal 
revenue collection. The disaggregated budgets of state-owned enterprises, audit 
responsibilities, and the procedures are not always transparent (Lynn and Oye, 2014).   
In 2002, then British Prime Minister Tony Blair launched the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), aiming the resource-rich countries to publicly disclose their 
income (Ross, 2011). Myanmar became the EITI candidate country in 2014 and it now 
submits the EITI annual progress report (EITI, 2017). This requirement will make it tougher 
for the military to hide their rents. The government thus should prioritize full implementation 
of EITI in the natural resource sector particularly in the jade sector by publishing data on 
license bidding processes, the production volumes; government revenues including revenues 




The NLD government should audit the accounts of state-owned enterprises and the 
military-owned conglomerates such as UMEHL or MEC and publish the details of all natural 
resource revenue receipts and transfers to the government. If the NLD government can 
enforce a greater transparency in the natural resource markets, the possibility of Tatmadaw to 
use state funds for graft is lesser.  
 
8.3. Higher Taxes 
Not only is levying proper taxes on the natural resource extraction important to 
mitigate tax holidays and illegal trade, but higher taxes on the natural resource sectors also 
reduce the production of the resources and increase the state revenues.  
Lynn and Oye (2014) analyze that it is very difficult to measure the exact share of 
revenues deriving from natural resources because (1) tax revenue includes taxes paid by 
concession companies and the state-owned enterprises; (2) taxes collected by different 
ministries and sub-national entities are not all uniformly recorded.  
The government’s the Internal Revenue Department targeted 332,591.27 million Kyat 
tax collection on minerals and gems, oil and gas, and logging forest in 2014/2015 (see Table 
4), which target was very low amount compared to what the military officials gained the rents 
from jade sales in 2015 alone.    
Table 4: IRD targets for tax collection on state-owned resources in 2014/2015 
 
Source: Lynn and Oye (2014) 
Thus, the NLD government should simplify and clarify taxes on the natural resource 
extraction, with input from the private sector, local people, and civil society and strengthen 
revenue collection systems to reduce tax evasion, impose higher taxes on the resource 
sectors. By imposing higher taxes on the natural resource sectors, the country not only earns 
higher revenues, but also it reduces the production of resource extraction.  
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All in all, in order to mitigate participation of the military in Myanmar’s economy and 
invent a free market system, it is very crucial to control the natural resource sectors which are 
a major incentive for the military to remain in the economy. To do so, the NLD government 
should do three possible solutions: reducing the production of the sources, making payments 
more transparent and levying higher taxes. Once the military loses its control over the natural 
resources, the characteristics of its centrally planned economy will no longer serve as the 
allocational and the distributional mechanism in Myanmar’s economy, and, an efficiently 
functioning market system will replace on the direct economy.   
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
This master thesis aims to have the free market system in Myanmar where the 
economic activities are unfettered from the military’s involvement and the economic 
functioning is fully fledged. Aiming to achieve this goal, the thesis has analyzed the barrier to 
an economic transition from the military’s intervention to a free market economy.  
The thesis has focused on the natural resource sector and analyzed whether it is a 
barrier to an economic transition toward a free market system. It has examined the three 
sectors of the natural resources namely the gems (jade, gold, and amber), oil and gas, and 
logging forest.  In gems sector, the data has shown us that the military has benefited a 
whopping amount of money from the jade extraction. It is very opaque how much revenue 
the military has gained from on oil and gas, and amber extraction since a reliable data is 
unobtainable as they do not disclose them. However, the thesis finds that the military was 
involved in the resource extractions through its companies ‘UMEHL’ and ‘MEC’ and 
business cronies, patronages such as police and individual serving officers in different ways. 
For example, it is not clear whether the payment from China for oil and gas pipeline goes to 
the state revenues since the government does not disclose the data publicly.  
Due to Tatmadaw’s control over the natural resources and the greater the natural 
resource endowment, the whole economy suffers of the secular stagnation and the Dutch 
Disease since the natural resource sector development has clear physical barriers to expansion 
while the rest of the economy is constrained by economic conditions (low profits, poor access 
to credit lines, low domestic demand). Moreover, the ‘rentier effects’ and ‘repression effects’ 




The military regime has used the natural resources for a political goal by granting 
concessions to ethnic insurgencies so as to demobilize the groups, sign ceasefire agreement, 
and transform to Border Guard Force or militia. Thus, the natural resources have become a 
major incentive for the military to remain in the economy, and in the national political setup, 
since not only have they gained the revenues from the resource extractions, but also they can 
use the resources for their political goals.  
China’s resource hunger is also conducive to Tatmadaw to remain in the economy by 
controlling the natural resources that China really needs and wants. As China needs 
substantial resources such as oil and gas, timber, copper, other mineral and electricity for the 
OBOR project and for its citizens, the military is a dominant position to trade the resources 
with China’s protection in international arena particular at the UN. Thus, China’s resource 
hunger makes it possible for the military regime to remain in the economy by exploiting the 
natural resources for their own benefits and political purposes. The military in Myanmar and 
the Chinese government are thus natural allies that both benefit vastly from their coalition, 
allowing the political and economic status quo in Myanmar to persist. 
In fact, the abundance of natural resources is a major incentive for the military to keep 
in the economy and is a barrier to the economic transition toward the free market system 
since the military has gained revenues from resource extractions and can use the natural 
resource as a tool of their political purpose and power-game.  
In order to reduce the military’s control over the natural resources and intervention in 
the economy, the thesis gives three possible policy recommendations, such as reducing 
production of the natural resources; making payments more transparent; and levying higher 
taxes on the resource businesses.  
All in all, if the three possible solutions can be implemented by the NLD government 
in Myanmar, the military regime will gradually give up its control over the natural resources 
and its participation in the whole economy. Myanmar will have the free market system where 
the economic activities are unfettered from the military’s participation and the government 
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Picture A: A giant £140 million worth jade stone 
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Picture B: Mass Demonstration over Jade Bill in Myitkyina 
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Picture C: Jade companies controlled by the family of former Senior General Than 
Shwe 
 















Map A: Gold Mining Areas in Hugawng Valley 
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Map B: Myanmar-China Shwe Gas Pipelines 
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